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Abstract: The current article explores the implication of the interaction of emotion and 
consciousness for autism. The framework that is proposed for the disorder explains that the 
compromised functional integrity of the amygdala is the root cause of disturbed affective con-
sciousness. Amygdala, with its connections to various cortical and subcortical regions, helps 
detect a fearful facial expression at the attentional periphery and make it the focus of attention 
and awareness for enhanced processing. The conscious life of autistics with respect to affective 
objects can thus be very different from that of normal people, which leads them to perceive the 
world differently. They process fearful stimuli the way normal controls perceive common objects 
by activating areas responsible for feature based analysis rather than the amygdala and other 
connected areas. Conscious perception of such stimuli is important for appropriate development 
of emotion concepts, something that autistics lack, thus leading to impairment in the awareness 
of one’s own emotions especially within the negative spectrum with a prominent position for 
fearful stimuli. Thus the interaction of emotion with consciousness is ripe for investigation and 
can help to throw light on the mental life of autistics.
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Introduction
It has recently been argued that consciousness and emotion interact with each other 
tremendously (Tsuchiya and Adolphs 2007). As the emotional processes interact with 
consciousness, such an interaction can have implications for cognitive and psychiatric 
disorders where the emotional processes have been found to be not normal.
According to Tsuchiya and Adolphs (2007), consciousness encompasses two com-
ponents: the level of a state of consciousness such as wakefulness, coma, and dreamless 
sleep, and its content, that is, whatever a person is conscious of at a particular point in 
time (eg, the color of a house). The contents of conscious experience can be analyzed 
into their phenomenal aspect. The focus of the current paper will be on the contents 
of consciousness, assuming the state of wakefulness, and in this case the contents will 
refer to emotional facial expression since humans rely heavily on facial expressions 
when communicating emotional states to others.
The aim of the current article is to show what implications such an interaction can 
have for the disorder of autism. Initially the interplay between consciousness and emo-
tions will be described before applying the description of the interplay to illuminate the 
disturbed affective consciousness in the disorder. For simplicity, the review will focus 
on fear processing. Moreover, ﬁ  ndings from studies, including samples of autistic as 
well as Asperger syndrome subjects, will be discussed in this paper.
It is important to keep in mind that only a framework for disturbed affective 
consciousness will be proposed. A framework is not a detailed hypothesis but is a 
suggested viewpoint for a particular scientiﬁ  c problem suggesting various hypotheses. 
A good framework sounds reasonably plausible given a particular set of scientiﬁ  c Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(3) 532
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data. It is unlikely to be correct in all its details and contains 
unstated though unrecognized assumptions but this is 
unavoidable due to the inherent nature of frameworks (Crick 
and Koch 2007).
A model of interaction between 
emotion and consciousness
The perception of some stimuli in the environment is impor-
tant for adaptive behavior; eg, an emotional face. Adaptive 
behavior requires that processing of some important stimuli 
such as an emotional face takes place independently of aware-
ness and attention so that attention could be guided towards 
these stimuli which ultimately receive enhanced processing 
due to their saliency even while falling outside the focus of 
attention. Hence, emotional faces conveying threat signals 
enjoy such privileged status (Vuilleumier 2002).
The amygdala plays a very important role in fear pro-
cessing. It receives highly processed information not only 
from the visual cortical pathways but also crude information 
through a direct subcortical pathway via the thalamus involv-
ing the retinocollicular and the pulvinar projections. The 
direct pathway provides fast signals about any potential threat 
in the environment such as a fearful face, which bypasses the 
slow and ﬁ  ne analysis of the visual cortex. Amygdala also has 
direct connections with the fusiform cortex and sends projec-
tions back to orbitofrontal, visual, and the medial prefrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus, basal forebrain nuclei, and 
striatum. These projections enable the amygdala to inﬂ  uence 
perceptual and motor processes in response to a threat cue 
(Vuilleumier 2002). This arrangement of connections can 
help bring the threatening face into the focus of awareness 
and attention after it was detected at the attentional periphery. 
In support of this claim, brain imaging studies have demon-
strated that visual cortical regions show enhanced activation 
in response to emotional stimuli (Kosslyn et al 1996). The 
magnitude of this enhanced activation in the visual cortex 
is correlated with the activation of the amygdala in response 
to these same stimuli (Morris et al 1998a). Vuilleumier and 
colleagues (2004) provided further support for the claim 
that the amygdala mediates enhanced responses in visual 
cortical regions for emotional stimuli. They presented fearful 
and neutral faces to normal control subjects, patients with 
damage to the hippocampus only, and patients with damage 
to the hippocampus and amygdala. Enhanced activation was 
observed in visual cortical regions for fear versus neutral 
faces in normal control and patients with damage conﬁ  ned 
to the hippocampus. Patients with damage to the amygdala 
did not show any signiﬁ  cant activation for fearful versus 
neutral faces in the visual cortex, which supports the role 
the amygdala plays in mediating transient changes in visual 
cortical processing in response to emotional stimuli.
Another set of results obtained by Pascual-Leone and 
Walsh (2001) supports the role of amygdala in bringing the 
fearful face detected at the periphery of attention to the focus 
of attentional and conscious processing. They show that 
conscious experience depends as much on the lower anatomi-
cal regions as on the higher ones but the lower processing 
anatomical regions participate at a later point in time. Thus 
areas like the early visual cortices and the amygdala and other 
structures engaged very early in processing contribute to con-
scious experience but can be compared with activity driven 
by feedback from higher regions during a later iteration of 
processing when the activity is driven by the stimulus.
Disorder of autism
Autism is a psychiatric syndrome characterized by impair-
ments in social interaction, communication, and restricted 
and repetitive behaviors and interests (Salmond et al 2003). 
Amygdala has been found to play a role in the neurobiology 
of autism (Baron-Cohen et al 2000). Ashwin and colleagues 
(2006) gathered evidence to show that compared with normal 
adults who activated areas of the social brain like the amyg-
dala while viewing fearful faces implying automatic emo-
tional appraisal of biologically relevant stimuli, the autistic 
individuals showed activations in the areas responsible for the 
processing of conscious and feature-based analysis of social 
and emotional stimuli. A similar conclusion was reached by 
Wang and colleagues (2004) based on the neuroimaging data 
that they obtained from children and adolescents. Further the 
control individuals in Ashwin and colleagues’ (2006) study 
also showed activations in the amygdala and other areas of 
the social brain similar to those which were responsible for 
face processing, in response to various intensities of fearful 
stimuli implying that the amygdala modulates activity in 
other brain areas to facilitate the processing of biologically 
relevant stimuli as compared with the autistics. The ﬁ  ndings 
show that the amygdala deﬁ  cits may have effects on other 
parts of the brain too.
Therefore the conscious life of autistics with respect to 
affective objects can be very different from that of normal 
people, which means that the environment might look dif-
ferent to different people due to their conscious awareness of 
various affective objects. It is very important to note again 
that objects having affective value can increase activations in 
both the amygdala and the central visual cortex (Pessoa et al 
2003) because of the extensive connections of the amygdala Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(3) 533
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with the ventral visual cortex. Consistent with the role of 
amygdala in visual conscious awareness of such objects, 
Pessoa and colleagues (2006) have shown that objective 
awareness of fearful faces at short presentation times is 
related to the co-activation of the amygdala and the fusiform 
gyrus (a portion of the ventral visual stream). Vuilleumier 
and colleagues (2002) have consistently shown that people 
with amygdala lesions show decreased activations in the 
fusiform gyrus in response to affective objects.
Conscious perception of emotions is very important for 
various mental processes. For instance, it has been shown by 
Honk and Schutter (2007) that the conscious perception of 
emotional faces serve as socially corrective signals that act 
to curtail misbehavior on the part of the perceiver. Conscious 
perception of emotional expressions is also important for the 
development of appropriate emotion concepts and autistics 
lack such a concept due to their inability to perceive such 
emotional signals in others, which thus leads to impairment 
in the awareness of one’s own emotions especially within 
the negative spectrum with a prominent position for fear 
(Rieffe et al 2007).
Conclusions
This paper provides a new framework which explains that the 
conscious life related to fear perception can be very different 
for people with autism, and causes a different perception of 
the world from the normal controls. Thus this area is ripe for 
investigation and will help better understanding of the mental 
life of autistics. The root cause of their problem lies at the 
compromised functional integrity of the amygdale, which 
plays a major role in visual awareness by bringing objects 
holding affective (eg, fear) value, detected at the attentional 
periphery to the focus of attention and awareness, due to its 
connections with various parts of the ventral visual stream 
and the prefrontal areas and the subcortical areas.
Some autistic symptoms might be related to the way 
emotions, especially fearful expressions, are perceived by 
the autistics. It has been shown that they perceive and pro-
cess fearful expressions the way other general objects are 
processed by normal individuals by activating areas respon-
sible for conscious and feature-based analysis of social and 
emotional stimuli, which implies that the signiﬁ  cance of such 
stimuli for them is equivalent to other common objects, and 
thus leads to the deﬁ  cits seen in the disorder.
Since conscious perception of such faces is important, 
it is quite likely that autistics consequently suffer from an 
inappropriate development of emotion concepts, which leads 
to impairment in the awareness of one’s own emotions, 
especially within the negative spectrum with a prominent 
position for fear.
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